This paper is to review the association of the magnitudes of ongoing related party transactions with the largest shareholders (ORPTs) on the ownership structure and their impact on corporate performance of Chinese listed firms after substantial reform of Chinese corporate governance framework in 2005. Previous literature found that the largest shareholders used related party transactions to tunnel or prop up their controlled firms for their own benefits. Based on a sample of 6657 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2011, the authors find that there is still a positive association between ownership of the largest shareholders and ORPTs, but no significant association between ORPTs and corporate performance, and therefore, there is no evidence that the largest shareholders use ORPTs to tunnel or prop-up their listed firms. This study also finds that there is an endogenous effect of ownership of the largest shareholders on ORPTs, and the authors suggest that the largest shareholders still have to retain the control of Chinese listed firms because in economic reality, those listed firms are still an integral part of business operations of the largest shareholders (business groups), i.e. alignment effect.
Introduction
In 1990's, the Chinese government re-established the stock market as a vehicle for her state-owned enterprises (SOE) to raise funds from the public through initial public offerings (IPO) to overcome their financial difficulties and improve their operating performance. Nowadays, in view of the significance in market capitalization and turnover, Chinese stock market has become one of the leading stock markets in the world. However, there have been several corporate scandals, especially those concerning related party transactions (RPTs) between the listed firms and their largest (controlling) shareholders.
Related party transactions in Chinese listed firms
Same as the practice in other countries, Chinese stock exchanges require profitability of the IPO candidates in the latest three years (track record) before the IPO, but the quality of the assets held by SOEs was highly variable; so many SOEs restructured themselves and spun off their core and high-quality (profitable) business segments and assets for IPO, while leaving their non-core businesses, assets, debts, and surplus manpower in the residual SOEs. In that way, SOEs were able to improve their chances of a successful listing of the spun-off portion (i.e. listed firms). The residual SOEs (business groups) normally retained control of the new listed entity as the largest shareholder (or controlling shareholder); however, having spun off their core assets, they were often forced to rely on the listed firms for support, resulting that there have been a series of RPTs between the listed firms and their controlling business groups in Chinese stock market. On one hand, the listed firms could raise funds through subsequent placements and bank loans, and then re-lend the funds to their largest shareholders or their controlled business groups. On the other hand, the listed firm's products might be sold to the business groups at unreasonably low prices, or the listed firm might make payments to the business group for "consulting services" while in fact no services had been provided. In some cases, the listed firms even provided collateral (guarantee) to help the group to obtain bank loans. The cost of these RPTs, which hurts the market value of the listed firms, was borne by the minority shareholders.
Further, some listed firms would have been propped up by their controlling shareholders for the purpose of IPO. As indicated by Leung and Cheng (2013) , Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) shows in its H-share prospectus that in 2008, before its corporate restructuring, ABC disposed of certain nonperforming assets to its controlling shareholders; otherwise, ABC would have had negative equity in the track record.
The issue of RPTs has been highly scrutinized by the scholars. Johnston et al. (2000) use the term "tunneling" to describe the diversion of resources between the controlling shareholder and its controlled firm at the expense of minority shareholders, while 
Ownership structure of Chinese listed firms
In order to retain the control of those Chinese listed firms, a typical Chinese listed firm has two classes of shares: tradable and non-tradable shares. Normally, the controlling shareholders hold about 40% of ownership of listed firms before the share reform (i.e. concentrated ownership in the hands of the largest shareholders). The largest (controlling) shareholders and the governments mostly hold those non-tradable shares (including state shares and restricted institutional shares) which could not be freely disposed of in the stock exchanges for cash, and those shares could only be transferred privately or through irregularly scheduled auctions. In addition, both tradable and non-tradable shares offered their holders the same dividend and voting rights per share, but non-tradable shares of those firms were priced at a significant discount to the tradable shares of the same firms, and those shares were not readily for sale in the stock market. Therefore, once the largest shareholders need funds for their own use, they were more likely to extract the funds from their controlled listed firms as mentioned in Section 1.1.
Due to higher concentrated ownership in Chinese listed firms, other large shareholders can rarely restrict the acts of the controlling shareholders. Several scholars (e.g. Tai After the completion of the share reform scheme, the non-tradable shares of Chinese listed firms can be converted into tradable portion, and therefore, the largest shareholders can readily dispose of those shares for cash, thereby reducing the likelihood of tunneling the resources of listed firms through RPTs. SSE (2012) states that after the completion of share reform scheme, the valuation of the interests of those controlling shareholders in the listed firms has been changed from the book value of the firms to the market value of the listed shares, and if the controlling shareholders engage in RPTs to expropriate their controlled firms, such effect would also deteriorate the value of the listed firms, resulting in the deterioration of interests of both controlling and minority shareholders. Hence, it is expected that the largest shareholders would not abuse RPTs to tunnel their controlled Chinese listed firms after the share reform.
Motivation of this study
Most studies focus on the firm's data before the share reform. For example, Hu, et al. (2009) Second, Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) was converged with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with effect from 2007, and the disclosure of such RPTs seems to be consistent with international standards. In addition, CAS No. 36 further requests enterprises to disclose the paid up capital of the related parties and pricing strategies for the RPTs and the auditors are also required to ensure the completeness and accuracy of that information contents in the financial statements (see Appendix 2) . From the information content related to RPTs, financial statement users can also assess the reasonableness of the amounts of RPTs and the firm size of the related parties. The authors expect that the increase in information dissemination of Chinese listed firms can reduce the likelihood of tunneling effects (see OECD1, 2012 (2) propping-up -the largest shareholders provide financial support through loans and advances to the listed firms and the motive and consequence are apparent and self-explanatory; (3) the transfer of assets, mostly in corporate reorganization, is strictly regulated by law and under a series of administrative procedures for approval and disclosure, and it should be non-current.
This section presents the historical background of RPTs in Chinese listed firms. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a review of the literature and establishes the testing hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research design. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and the conclusions drawn from this study are presented in Section 5.
Literature review and hypotheses

Ownership structure and related party transactions (RPTs)
A classical agency problem that arises as a result of the separation of ownership and management when ownership is widely dispersed (Jensen and Meckling, 1996) . However, as mentioned in Section 1.2, ownership of Chinese listed firms is concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholders, and therefore, the concentrated ownership of a listed firm can, in principle, lead to the following agency problems:
(1) conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1996 Previous literature has addressed the association between the magnitudes of RPTs and corporate governance mechanisms of Chinese listed firms. As the ownership structure is a key corporate governance factor, this paper focuses on the association of the magnitudes of ongoing RPTs (ORPTs) and ownership structure.
As mentioned in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, most of contemporary Chinese listed firms have been spun off from Chinese business groups for the purpose of IPO and the controlling shareholders retain the control of their listed firms by holding the substantial ownership of those listed firms.
When a controlling shareholder obtains controlling power, the primary agency issue is not the potential conflict of interest between management and shareholders, but to prevent the controlling shareholder from taking benefits at the expenses of minority shareholders (Shleifer and In this paper, the authors examine the association between ORPTs and corporate performance of Chinese listed firms because ORPTs are ongoing (regular) and may have two potential consequences: (1) As RPTs are conducted at arm's length basis or measured in the same prices and conditions with non-related third parties, they are motivated by purely economic reasons (e.g. to realign the firm operations) and there is no potential tunneling or propping-up effect (Cheung et al., 2009 ). Chen et al. (2012) state that ORPTs decrease the transaction costs of listed firms or increase its value (efficiency enhancing theory); (2) As RPTs are not at the arm's length basis, with the possible dual effects of tunneling and propping-up to achieve the specific needs of the controlling shareholders (Cheung et al., 2009 ). The prices and conditions of RPTs between a listed firm and its largest shareholder are unfair or abnormal, for tunneling, i.e. the transaction costs are more favorable to the largest shareholders, and the firm's resources are transferred to business groups , or earnings management, under which the listed firm can maintain its profitability of ROE not less than three years for subsequent issues of new shares for fund raising, or avoid recurrent loss for being delisted (Liu and Liu (2008) classify the benchmark of ROE of 6% as a division for the potential tunneling or propping-up: (1) for firm with ROE of higher than 6%, the controlling shareholder is likely to transfer its interest to the listed firm through RPTs (propping-up); (2) for low-performing firm (ROE less than 6%), the controlling firm is likely to tunnel the resources of its controlled firm through RPTs (tunneling). Therefore, the following hypothesis is made:
H2: There is an association between ORPTs and the corporate performance of Chinese listed firms.
H2 is further divided into H2.1 and H2.2 in respect of the benchmark of ROE at 6%: 
Research design and model
The empirical model used in this paper is based on Tai (1) The magnitudes of ongoing related party transactions (ORPTs) Sales transactions (RPT_SALES) include both the sales of goods and the provision of services to the largest shareholder and its controlled entities; purchase transactions (RPT_PURCHASES) include both the purchase of goods and the receipt of services from the largest shareholder and its controlled entities. In this paper, the values of these variables are divided by the total sales, i.e. the business size, to determine the magnitudes to which Chinese listed firms are engaged in particular types of RPTs, consistent with Chen et al. Therefore, this paper introduces "net operating cash flow" as the third proxy for corporate performance, consistent with Bowen et al. (2008) . OCF_SALES is the net cash flow from operating activities divided by the total sales.
(3) Testing variables -Ownership of the largest shareholder and the alliance of other large shareholders Ownership of the largest shareholder and other large shareholders Consistent with previous literature, TOP1, the ownership of the largest shareholders is used as the proxy.
Some studies presume that other large shareholders can restrict the tunneling effect by the largest shareholders. This study presumes the alliance of the second to fifth largest shareholders can restrict the acts of the largest shareholders, and aggregate ownership of the second to fifth large shareholders TOP2_5 is used as the proxy (e.g. Table 2 .
Hypothesis 1 is to account for the association of ORPTs on the ownership of the largest shareholders and the counter-balance of other large shareholders. Eq (1) is formulated as follows: 2 The natural logarithm of the total assets of Chinese listed firms (lnSALES) was also considered as a control variable for the firm size of these listed firms. As the correlation coefficient between lnSALES and lnTA was extremely high (0.854 at the 1% significance level) in pretesting, the authors selected lnTA only as a control variable for business size. 3 Gao and Kling (2008) consider Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong as the developed eastern coastal region, which might exhibits better governance structures.
RPT
( (2) is run based on (1) the whole sample, (2) those firms with ROE of at least 6% (propping-up effect) and (3) those firms with ROE of less than 6% (tunneling effect). Eq (2) is formulated as follows:
CP (TQ, ROA, OCF_SALES)i,t = ß0 + ß1RPT_SALESi,t + ß2RPT_PURCHASESi,t + ß3lnTAi,t + ß4LEVi,t + ß5GROW_TAi,t + ß6GROW_SALESi,t + ß7MIi,t + ß8SCLFi,t + ß9FIXED_EFFECTSi,t + ɛi,t
whereɛis the random error term of the model; i is the ith firm and t is the year. Table 3 presents the details of the sample. Our sample period covers five years, from 2007 to 2011, and the data was obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Data Base (CSMAR). There are 9462 firm-year observations for these five years, of which 160 observations are from the financial sector, 574 observations are under special treatment (ST) status4 and 2071 observations with missing variables are excluded 5 . Our final sample contains 6657 firmyear observations. 4 In accordance with Article 13.2.1 of listing rules of both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, a Chinese listed firm that has a negative equity or has been creating losses for two consecutive years is labeled as a ST firm, which is subject to additional regulations, such as the announcement of its quarterly results and an external audit on its interim financial results. 5 Most scholars exclude these financial sectors and ST firms because those firms are subject to additional regulations. Table 1 ). The mean of TOP2_5 is 14.2%, and much lower than that of TOP1, indicating that the alignment of other large shareholders is unlikely to restrict the acts of the largest shareholders in Chinese listed firms. Table 5 presents the frequencies and the percentages of dummy variables and industry categories of our sample. The percentage of those listed firms which are registered in eastern coastal region (MI) amount to 58.6% indicating that more than half of them are governed in a higher competition market; and 38.2% of them are under state control (SCLF), indicating that political pressure may still have significant influence on Chinese stock market. RPT_SP amount to 50.6%, indicating that more than half of Chinese listed firms are still an integral part of their largest shareholders or business groups as they provide the goods and services to, and receive goods and services from, their largest shareholders and their business groups. Table 6 presents the distribution of ownership of the largest shareholders (TOP1) in Chinese listed firms in our sample. Ownership of the largest shareholders concentrates in the range between 10 and 50%, and most noticeably, about 23.2% in the range of 20 and 30%, indicating that the ownership of Chinese listed firms is still highly concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholders. Table 7 reports correlation coefficients. The correlation coefficients between the independent variables are generally low, indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem in the interpretation of the results.
Research results and interpretation
Data source and sample selection
Multiple regression analysis
This section reports on the results of the multiple regression analysis with respect to the two hypotheses. The results are shown in Tables 8 to 11 . According to Berman (2007) , the variance inflation factor (VIF) values of variables that do not exhibit multicollinearity are usually between 1.0 and 2.0. The collinearity test results show that none of the independent variables in this paper have a VIF of over 2 (not tabulated). According to these results and the correlation analysis of these variables shown in Table  7 , multicollinearity is not considered to be a problem for either model. Table 8 reports on the regression results for the association of ownership and the magnitudes of RPTs. TOP1 is positively related to RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHASES at the 1% significance level, respectively, implying that the magnitudes of ORPTs increase in line with ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with previous literature mentioned in Section 2.1.
The association of ownership and the magnitudes of ORPTs
TOP2_5 is not significantly related to any of RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHASES, indicating that the alignment of other large shareholders cannot restrict ORPTs.
More surprisingly, lnTA is negatively related to RPT_SALES, but positively related to RPT_PURCHASES, each at 1% significant level, implying that the smaller-sized listed firms heavily relied upon the largest shareholders (business groups) on the sources of raw materials and supporting services; while the larger-sized firms are quite independent in the sales and business operations from their largest shareholders and business groups. MI is negatively related to RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHASES at the 1% significance level, indicating that the issue of RPTs is also serious in those registered in non-eastern coastal region mostly because there is less product competition in that region (Gao et al., 2006) . RPT_SP is positively related to RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHASES at the 1% significance level, maybe because the magnitude of ORPTs becomes more significant when a listed firm is still an integral part (in both upstream and downstream) of the business group.
Some studies demonstrate that there may be a significant "U-shaped" or non-linear relationship between ownership of the largest shareholders and tunneling effects (e.g. Li, et al., 2004; He and Liu, 2005) . First sensitivity test was performed using Eq (1) and TOP12 was inserted to replace TOP1. TOP12 is positively related to RPT_SALEAS and RPT_PURCHSASES, at 1 % significance level, respectively, indicating that there is a "U-shaped" association between ownership of the largest shareholders and the magnitudes of OPRTs, and after the threshold percentage, there is a positive association between these two factors. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 is supported (see also Robustness check on TOP1 and ORPTs in Section 4.3.3).
Second sensitivity test is rerun by eliminating TOP1. The results of second sensitivity test show that TOP2_5 is negatively related to RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHASES without the presence of TOP1 and such association is consistent with the correlation as shown in Table 5 , but TOP2_5 is only negatively related to RPT_PURCHASES at 1% significant level. Some scholars find that the alliance of other large shareholders may restrict the tunneling effects through RPTs in some incidents (e.g. Li et al., 2004; Tai et al., 2007; Liu, 2008) . Our results support that in principle, the alignment of other large shareholders seems to restrict to ORPTs with the largest shareholder; however, in practice, since the aggregate ownership of those large shareholders is relatively lower than that of the largest shareholders and therefore, Hypothesis 1.2 is not supported. (1) Table 9 reports the regression results for the association of ORPTs and the corporate performance. All of TQ, ROA and OCF_SALES are insignificantly related to RPT_SALES, RPT_PURCHASES and RPT_SP in (1) the whole sample, (2) those with ROE of not lower than 6% (possible propping-up effect) and (3) Table 5 . lnTA is negatively related to TQ, ROA and OCF_SALES in all cases, indicating that small business firms have higher impact on corporate performance 6. Apparently, there is no tunneling effect on ORPTs between Chinese listed firms and their largest shareholders when the listed firms have ROE of less than 6%; there is no propping-up effect on those RPTs when the listed firms have ROE of not less than 6%; and there is no effect on the whole sample. No tunneling effects might result as there is a alignment between the interests of the largest and minority shareholders because their shares are readily for sales after the completion of share reform as mentioned in Section 1.2.
The association between ORPTs and corporate performance
The results of descriptive statistics present that corporate performance of those listed firms is violently dispersed over those years and across industries. Accordingly, four sensitivity tests are performed:
(1) only RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHAHSES included in Eq (2), i.e. only one RPT variable is included; (2) Eq (2) is run on yearly basis, consistent with the research model of Tai et al. (2007) ; (3) Eq (2) is run based on manufacturing sector only (C), MI and non-MI groups, and SCLF and non-SCLFs group, respectively; and (4) two ownership structure variables, TOP1 and TOP2_5 are added into Eq (2). The results of these sensitivity tests (not tabulated) further confirm that there is no association between ORPTs and corporate performance, and therefore, there is no evidence that the largest shareholders use ORPTs to tunnel or propup their controlled listed firms.
Therefore, Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 are not supported.
Robustness check on TOP1 and ORPTs
Several scholars argue whether the largest shareholders can control the listed firms and are able to effectively influence the listed firms when they hold an insignificant percentage of the total equity shares (e.g. Chan et al., 2006; Lin and Liu, 2009; Cullinan et al., 2012) . Chan et al. (2006) consider the threshold of 20% for the implications of control. In addition to 20% cut-off, the authors also consider "significant influence" or "control" in accordance with the legal framework and professional practice on them, and set the threshold percentages (breakeven points) to be 20%, 30% 7 and 50% 8 . Eq (1) is rerun by (1) 20% cut-off (i.e. eliminating those observations with ownership of the largest shareholders less than 20% of the total equity), (2) 30% cut-off (i.e. eliminating those observations with ownership of the largest shareholders less than 30% of the total equity) and (3) 50% cut-off (i.e. eliminating those observations with ownership of the largest shareholders not higher than 50% of the total equity). Table 10 reports the regression results of ownership structure and ORPTs in three panels. Except for 50% cut-off in which TOP1 is insignificant to RPT_PURCHASES, TOP1 is positively related to RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHASES. Such results support our argument in Section 4.3.1 that after the threshold percentage of ownership of the largest shareholders, TOP1 is positively related to ORPTs.
Endogenous effect of TOP1 on
ORPTs (endogenous ownership theory) Chen et al. (2004) suggest that ownership structure is determined by the trade-off of many factors, including firm value, and firm value is likely to affect ownership structure. To examine the potential endogenous effects between ORPTs and TOP1, Eq (1) was modified so that TOPSHARE is the dependent variable and any of RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHAHSES are the independent variables as follows:
TOP1i,t =ß0 + ß1 ORPT (RPT_SALESi,t, RPT_PURCHASESi,t) + ß2TOP2_5i,t + ß3lnTAi,t + ß4LEVi,t + ß5GROW_TAi,t + ß6GROW_SALESi,t + ß7MIi,t + ß8SCLFi,t + ß9FIXED_EFFECTSi,t+ɛi,t (3) whereɛis the random error term of the model; i is the ith firm and t is the year. Table 11 reports the results of this regression and there is a significant endogenous effect of ownership of the largest shareholder on ORPTs, as both any of RPT_SALES and RPT_PURCHAHSES and both variables are positively related to TOP1 in those three scenarios. This association supports our explanation on why the largest (controlling) shareholders still hold substantial ownership (say about 40% as mentioned) in Chinese listed firms after IPO and even after the completion of share reform, mostly because the largest shareholder could exercise significant control on them to maintain the continuity of RPTs between listed firms and the business groups as well as the business operations of the whole group (alignment effect). Therefore, we can interpret that in economic reality, most Chinese listed firms are still an integral part of the business operations of their largest shareholders, and even after the completion of share reform, the ownership of the largest shareholders remains the same as that before the share reform, as the largest shareholders can retain the control on their listed firms. In other words, because of having a high portion of ORPTs between the largest shareholders and their controlled firms, the largest shareholders should maintain high ownership on those firms to reduce the threats of discontinued operations of their business groups.
Summary of the regression results
This paper reexamines the association of ORPTs with ownership structure and corporate performance after the financial reform. Overall, there is still a positive association between ownership of the largest shareholders and the magnitudes of ORPTs, and the alignment of other large shareholders seems to be unable to restrict such RPTs. Hopefully, since the largest shareholders (and the related shareholders/directors) must abstain the voting in the relevant shareholders' (and directors') meeting when any RPTs are reviewed and approved, it is expected that other large shareholders can, in practice, restrict the unfair (unfavorable) RPTs between the largest shareholders and their controlled listed firms.
More surprisingly, the magnitudes of such RPTs seem not to have significant impact on corporate performance, and there seems not to have tunneling effect nor propping-up effects on Chinese listed firms, more likely because (1) the adoption of new Chinese Accounting Standards enhances the disclosure of information content of RPTs, especially the pricing policies and financial position of related parties, (2) new rules and regulations have been implemented for the governance of the disclosure and internal approval of RPTs in Chinese listed firms, and those ORPTs are subject to the review by independent auditors and valuers, (3) after share reform scheme, the interests of the largest and minority shareholders become the same because both interests in the listed firms are valued at the market price, and (4) the largest (controlling) shareholder can readily realize the shares of their listed firms for cash after the completion of share reform, reducing the likelihood of embezzlement of the firms' resources through tunneling. These institutional reform can restrict the largest shareholders to engage RPTs to tunnel and prop up (earnings management) their controlled listed firms.
Conclusion
This study is to explore the association among the ownership structure, the magnitudes of ORPTs and corporate performance of Chinese listed firms after the financial reform.
Before the financial reform, most literature found that it was common for the largest shareholders to transfer interests to controlled firms (propping-up), or to tunnel interest from the listed firms to themselves, through several types of RPTs. The propping-up was to manipulate the profitability of listed firms for IPO or subsequent share issue for funds raising, and then the funds were flowed back to the controlling shareholders. Both the motive of propping-up and tunneling is mainly to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders. This paper finds that there is no significant change on ownership of the largest shareholders in Chinese listed firms after the completion of share reform scheme, and there is still a significant positive effect of ORPTs on ownership of the largest shareholders. Nevertheless, the results of this study do not find any significant association between the magnitudes of ORPTs and corporate performance of Chinese listed firms since 2007. This paper further finds that there is an endogenous effect of ownership of the largest shareholders on ORPTs, suggesting that the largest shareholders have to retain control on those listed firms to maintain the survival of their business groups, but apparently there is no potential of tunneling or propping-up effect.
After the occurrence of a series of corporate scandals in Chinese listed firms, Chinese government, the regulators and stock exchanges are recurrently revising the legal framework to restrict certain RPTs, and regulate ORPTs which should be conducted at arm's length basis. We expect that with the open of commodity markets, the magnitudes of ORPTs and their potential embezzlements and earnings management can be further reduced in future. 
